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Abstract 
In this manuscript, we argue that supply chain management choices are affected by both the 
extent to which there is a risk of disruption within the supply chain and external to the supply 
chain as well. We suggest that the formal governance mechanisms that are favored under 
different conditions of endogenous and exogenous supply chain risk reflect the risk 
management preferences of the supply chain partners. In this preliminary study of public 
sector supply chains, we found evidence suggesting that, as expected, when endogenous 
risk is low, suppliers tend to bear most of the disruption risk by agreeing to fixed price 
contracts. Conversely, when endogenous risk is high but exogenous risk is low, buyers 
(governments) are willing to bear most of the risk by agreeing to cost reimbursement or time 
and materials contracts. When both endogenous and exogenous risk is high, we found partial 
support of the proposition that buyers and suppliers are more likely to share risk by agreeing 
to incentive contracts. 
Introduction 
Supply chains are complex in at least two fundamental aspects—the complexity or 
complicatedness of the product, and the uncertainty of information exchange across 
different organizations (Vachon & Klassen, 2002). Gailbraith (1973, 1977) is credited as 
describing this complexity and elaborating on ways that organizations can manage 
uncertainty through better information processing. Flynn and Flynn (1999) apply these 
concepts to a manufacturing supply chain, noting six drivers of manufacturing environment 
complexity related to the diversity of management tasks in manufacturing, goals, processes, 
customers, suppliers, and labor, while Vachon and Klassen (2002) also note complexity in 
managing supply chains that cross international boundaries. In short, as products become 
more complicated and as more actors with diverse goals become involved in the production 
of some good or service, coordination becomes more difficult. 
For the most part, this research has focused on complications that reside within the 
supply chain. These mostly relate to aspects of market uncertainty, either in terms of the 
resources required in the manufacturing of a product or the stability of demand for the final 
good. However, there is also uncertainty that is exogenous to the supply chain and while 
“endogenous uncertainty can be decreased by actions of the firm” (Folta, 1998, p. 1010), 
“exogenous uncertainty is largely unaffected by firm actions” (Folta, 1998, p. 1011). 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 153 - 
Exogenous uncertainty can come from a variety of different sources, such as geopolitical 
factors or natural disasters, but it ultimately relates to some sort of information that is 
missing which makes committing resources to production risky, particularly if those 
investments are highly specific to the product in question. 
Firms deal with uncertainty through risk management. In general, when endogenous 
uncertainty is located in resource acquisition, downstream partners are willing to share risk 
with upstream partners, and conversely, when risk is in the demand market, upstream 
partners are willing to share risk with those closest to the market (Flynn & Flynn, 1999). 
Exogenous uncertainty is more difficult to prepare for and manage, and it may affect any 
portion of the supply chain (Trkman & McCormack, 2009). Since exogenous risks may not 
be as manageable, exchange partners will seek a common understanding of the terms of 
the exchange in order to reduce endogenous costs, namely the transaction costs of the 
exchange, so that the total costs of the exchange are low enough to deal with the 
exogenous uncertainty should any unforeseen shocks occur (Weber & Mayer, 2014). The 
complication is that these risks must be managed ex ante. 
Our interest is in a domain where these risks, particularly exogenous risks, may be 
prevalent: public management. Public sector supply chains are subject to a variety of 
different exogenous factors associated with the political system, legal institutions, 
bureaucratic processes, and geopolitics, in addition to endogenous factors such as highly 
specific products and measurement complexity (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke, 2006; Dixit, 
2002). While managers take care of daily supply chain tasks, a public sector supply chain is 
ultimately controlled by political authorities who decide to either allocate resources for the 
purchase of the goods in the supply chain or not. There is no functional market for the goods 
procured, and political actors’ responses to events are often unpredictable. Some public 
sector supply chains, for things like accounting services or janitorial work, may be relatively 
resilient to external events, while others, like aerospace or military procurement, may reside 
in highly turbulent environments (Peck, 2005).  
It is well accepted that managerial strategies are different when a supply chain is 
susceptible to endogenous risk (Manuj, Esper, & Stank, 2014). In this research, we argue 
that supply chains are also managed differently depending on the susceptibility of the supply 
chain to being affected by exogenous disruptions. In short, when the risk of disruption due to 
exogenous factors is high, we argue that risk will be shared between the exchange partners 
as a means of buffering the supply chain from external events. When exogenous risk is low, 
the risk management strategy will be determined by the nature of endogenous risk. 
Supply Chain Risk 
Endogenous 
Endogenous risks are generally of two kinds: supply side, or resource-related risks, 
and demand side, or market-related risks. There are various points at which disruptions can 
occur in supply chains. Fluctuations in market demand can be expected, but there can be 
more volatility for certain final goods, and this volatility will affect the entire supply chain. 
There can be uncertainty in access to resources required for the production of the final good 
(both undersupply and oversupply), including fluctuations in natural resources, labor, 
technology, and access to capital for exchange partners. Coordination in the supply chain 
can be challenging due to the well-known bullwhip effect (Lee, Padmanabhan, & Whang, 
1997) which occurs when each exchange partner makes ordering decisions in isolation, 
causing inefficient repercussions within the supply chain. Further, each of these effects 
becomes exacerbated as the complexity of the product increases and as more exchange 
partners are in the supply chain (Flynn & Flynn, 1999).  
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Exogenous 
Exogenous risks exist beyond the focal supply chain, and thus the actors in the 
supply chain have little ability to control these events. Trkman and McCormack (2009) 
identify two types of exogenous uncertainty, discrete events and continuous risks, and 
suggest that different approaches may need to be taken to manage both types of 
uncertainty. Continuous risks are those that occur at a relatively stable rate and are 
generally more predictable than discrete risks, and while the exact timing of an occurrence 
is not known, the risk is more or less stable over time. Continuous risks may be events such 
as economic downturns, cross-cultural complications, or changing political environments 
due to election cycles or policymaker interest. Discrete risks are less predictable shocks to 
the external environment. These risks may include natural disasters, geopolitical events 
such as terrorism or international conflict, political or broad-based labor strife, or 
technological changes.  
Managing Risk 
There are many different specific strategies available for supply chain risk 
management (SCRM; Tang, 2006). Private sector firms have been shown to follow a few 
general approaches depending upon the nature of the supply chain risk. For endogenous 
supply risk, firms can hedge, that is attempt to secure resources from a variety of different 
suppliers, or they can assume and internalize the risk, by incurring production internally, for 
example. For endogenous demand risks, firms can postpone or delay production, or they 
can speculate and maintain inventory until demand stabilizes (Manuj, Esper, & Stank, 2014). 
Tang (2006) also notes that firms can adapt processes or products to deal with new 
circumstances or risks, or they can open information exchange to ensure that each partner 
in the supply chain has access to the same information. In short, the approach to managing 
endogenous risk is to mitigate the chances of disruption, to the extent possible, and 
implement strategies to minimize disruptions when they occur in order to ensure the efficient 
operation of the supply chain.  
For exogenous risk, options for information sharing, hedging, postponing, or holding 
inventory may be much less effective. Hedging will be ineffective because an exogenous 
shock will be external to any particular supply chain, and it is likely that all or at least most 
suppliers will be affected by whatever the exogenous shock was. Regardless of the diversity 
of suppliers, the focal firm’s supply chain will be impacted. Demand focused strategies will 
be risky because a shock may cause an unpredicted and fundamental shift in the nature of 
the demand for a product. In this scenario, postponing may lead to shortages because 
demand may recover, leaving the supply chain unable to meet demand. Conversely, holding 
inventory will be costly if demand never recovers. Finally, sharing information is unlikely to 
have an effect if the source of the disruption is external to the supply chain because the 
shock will be out of the control of any of the exchange partners and no firm is likely to have 
access to any more information than another.  
The main strategy available for managing exogenous uncertainty is therefore to 
assume and internalize the risk within the supply chain. This can be done by ensuring that 
the parties to the exchange have a common understanding of the nature of both the 
exchange and the exogenous risks and coordinate activities to the extent that costs internal 
to the supply chain, namely the costs of the transaction, are as low as possible, leaving 
adequate resources to manage any exogenous shocks that occur and enabling the partners 
to internalize the potential costs of exogenous changes (Weber & Mayer, 2014). The key 
aspect in managing exogenous risk is thus not to take steps to avoid risky scenarios 
because exogenous risks cannot be avoided, but rather to take steps to ensure that the 
supply chain is resilient to the disruptions that do occur. There are a number of approaches 
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that can be taken to improve resilience, such as building flexibility into the contract in case 
one organization in the chain bears the brunt of the effects of the shock, discussing potential 
disruptions throughout the supply chain to ensure that there is a common understanding of 
the things that could potentially occur, and deriving contingency plans and processes in 
advance should disruptions occur (Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke, 2015). 
Public Sector Supply Chains 
Public sector supply chains offer a good context to understand SCRM due to their 
propensity to be affected by exogenous factors. A key reason why this is the case is that 
there is only one “consumer” for the end products, and it is a fickle consumer—the polity. In 
the U.S., the polity is represented in these exchanges by Congress and the President. With 
one buyer (the government broadly), there is no real market for the end goods, and owing to 
the non-excludable and non-rivalrous nature of public goods, pricing and, thus, demand are 
difficult or impossible to ascertain for many of the things that the government purchases. On 
the supply side, many products are idiosyncratic and involve highly technical or scarce 
materials, and policies often limit where those materials can come from and what sorts of 
vendors should be selected.  
Internally, this means that there is often considerable endogenous risk owing to the 
high level of asset specificity that might be required of vendors to produce goods or services 
for the government, and the technical complicatedness of these goods and services may 
require numerous subcontractors and sources of supplies for the final product, with each 
relationship adding complexity to the management of the supply chain (Eriksson, 2015). 
Externally, public sector supply chains are subject to significant supply and demand 
uncertainty. Supplies can be disrupted by natural or manmade disasters that reduce the 
availability of needed resources or by having few potential vendors with the expertise to 
produce the good or service. Demand can be affected in numerous unexpected ways by 
disasters or other focusing events, but also due to changes in the political context via 
elections, interest group activity, or erratic shifts of interest from particular political authorities 
from either Congress or the Executive branch agencies.  
It is typically left to public managers to deal with these risks and be prepared to 
respond to them. Public managers can take cues from private sector SCRM 
recommendations in cases where efficient supply chain operation is an overriding goal, but 
owing to the complex environment of public sector decision-making and the often esoteric 
nature of the public goods and services that are produced, although always a goal, 
efficiency is not always going to be the overriding goal. In the private sector, an efficiently 
operating supply chain that is producing a product that meets a market demand is likely in a 
good position to be resilient (Tang, 2006), but in the public sector this may or may not be the 
case. New political authorities may gain control and opt to pursue other priorities, or a shock 
in some other policy area may convince policymakers to shift resources away. Moreover, 
wholly inefficient supply chains may thrive in the public sector if the good or service being 
produced is valued by powerful actors or if the production process benefits powerful actors 
(Kim & Brown, 2012; Eckerd & Snider, 2016).  
This is not to say that the efficiency of the supply chain and the quality of the end 
product are unimportant, but the overriding goal may be ensuring that the supply chain is 
buffered from external volatility in order to protect the organizations that are involved in the 
exchange. For some public products and services, efficiency and product/service quality are 
likely good buffering techniques in that they are producing a good or service that has wide 
political support and is in less danger of exogenous risk, but in other contexts, garnering the 
support of key political actors may be more important, while in others the goal might be to 
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stay “off the radar” as much as possible. Along these lines, Frumkin and Galaskiewicz 
(2004) find that public managers tend to be more externally focused in their management 
decisions than private managers do. Governmental organizations “[lack] a single 
stakeholder group to monitor the organization,” such as a board of directors or investors 
(Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004, p. 289). As such, public managers, as compared with 
business organizations “are more likely to embrace external referents of accountability to 
legitimate their operations” and “should be more susceptible to institutional pressures and 
more likely to be swayed by exposure to environmental pressures that promise an 
organization greater legitimacy” (Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004, p. 289). Along similar lines, 
managing exogenous risks may occupy more managerial capacity than dealing with internal 
issues. 
SCRM in the public sector is thus likely more focused on the external environment 
and particularly focused on buffering the supply chain from those exogenous risks against 
which there may be some means to do so, at least under some circumstances. As we lay 
out in detail below, we expect public sector SCRM to have a more procedural than an 
outcome-oriented focus when exogenous exposure is high. However, we expect that when 
the key risks are low or endogenous, public sector supply chains will behave similarly to 
private sector supply chains. This is because when endogenous risk is low, the product or 
service is likely not particularly complex, so the assets needed for production will not be 
specific. In these situations, there are likely multiple potential suppliers, and public 
organizations (like their private sector counterparts) can therefore hedge and be prepared to 
solicit offers from a variety of different vendors. When products are more complex but 
exogenous risk relatively low, internalization of risk is more likely. Governments can opt to 
produce these goods or services internally or when they are procured through a supply 
chain to internalize the risk to ensure the stability of the supply chain as much as possible 
(Brown & Potoski, 2003). That is, with low exogenous risk, public managers may be more 
willing to bear the burden of risk, assured that the external environment is stable for them, 
and allow their supply chain partners to be buffered from risk as much as possible, or the 
production process can be managed strictly internally. 
However, these strategies are likely to be altered by the extent to which the supply 
chain is susceptible to exogenous risk. In short, we argue that the more that the supply 
chain is subject to external risk, the more that the supply process requires buffering and 
sharing of risk across the supply chain, potentially in ways that are contrary to what we 
might expect given the endogenous risks of disruption. Before developing our argument of 
exogenous risk, we first explain risk management techniques as they relate to the public 
sector. 
One of the key ways to manage risk is though the governance of the supply chain 
relationship (Folta, 1998) and specifically through the structuring of the contract between 
supply chain partners. There are two general types of contracts, the formal or written 
contract and the informal or relational contract (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). The relational 
contract is the ongoing establishment and reinforcement of norms between contracting 
partners that can be used to facilitate the resilience of the supply chain (Ring & van de Ven, 
1994), but our interest here is with respect to the design of the formal contract which better 
represents an ex ante risk management strategy. In public sector contracting, there are 
three general approaches to a formal contract, each representing different approaches to 
dealing with risk. Although there are many variations of these three different types of 
contracts, a contract falls under an umbrella of being a fixed cost, incentive, or cost 
reimbursement structure. A fixed price contract is just that—the government will propose a 
price that it is willing to pay for some good or service and solicit bids from vendors to provide 
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the good or service. Fixed price contracts are often short term in nature and place relatively 
few constraints on vendors. Under cost reimbursement contracts, the government will 
propose a good, service, or task and solicit bids, reimbursing the vendor for the costs 
incurred in delivering the product. Incentive contracts are in between; there will be some 
minimum commitment of funds provided by the government and services rendered by the 
vendor, and if the vendor exceeds that minimum, then the vendor receives additional money 
(or conversely, if the vendor fails to meet expectations, there may be sanctions). Time and 
materials contracts are another commonly used type of contract, but are considered a form 
of cost reimbursement contracts (Kim & Brown, 2012). Time and materials are preferable 
when the buyer needs flexibility, but the supplier has little incentive to optimize efficiency as 
they are compensated for inputs (Roels, Karmarkar, & Carr, 2010). 
The contract that is chosen offers a view of the SCRM strategy. A fixed price contract 
can be viewed as a hedging strategy and is most likely useful with low complexity products. 
Simple products or services are likely to have more actual or potential suppliers, enabling 
the government to dictate the market and put the onus of risk on the supplier. This provides 
the supplier with flexibility on how the task gets done, but if there are any disruptions, the 
risk falls on the vendor who agreed to provide a certain amount of some product for the 
specified price. If disruptions occur and the contract is deemed unsatisfactory, the 
government can simply find a different supplier. We expect that when a supply chain is not 
especially prone to endogenous risk, fixed price contracts will be favored, particularly when 
the supply chain is also not especially prone to exogenous risk. This is because the 
products in question are likely not complex, the assets are likely not specific, and with a low 
chance of risk and a buyer’s market, the supplier will bear risk. 
In situations where endogenous risk is higher, for example when a product or service 
is complex and buyers are limited, options for hedging are likely to be limited due to a 
smaller set of potential suppliers, so risk will need to be internalized by the buyer. This can 
be done by using a cost reimbursement contract, which places the risk on the buyer which is 
the government in this case. By internalizing risk this way, governments can enable 
suppliers’ willingness to shoulder the costs of highly specific assets and ensure a relatively 
stable supply of a needed product. There is clear potential for mutual benefit; suppliers face 
less risk knowing that investment costs will be recouped, while the government saves 
resources by not having to manage the highly specific assets required. Thus, when 
endogenous risk is high, we expect cost reimbursement contracts to be favored.  
However, these considerations may be changed when a supply chain is susceptible 
to high levels of exogenous risk, such as projects that are very salient with political 
authorities. We can conceive of exogenous risks in a variety of different ways, but the public 
management context offers a relatively clear way to assess one aspect of exogenous risk: 
the interest that the political system has on the product or service in question (Epstein & 
Segal, 2000). If a particular project has little salience with the public, then it likely has little 
salience with Congress, and is therefore less exposed to potential political disruption than a 
program that is well known. While this may not be the only type of exogenous risk that a 
public sector supply chain would be exposed to, it is one of the more continuous types of 
risk for which a strategy may be devised to manage it (in contrast to dynamic risks like 
natural disasters that can be planned for but are less predictable). 
The choice of which contract type is selected can provide an indication of the risk 
management strategy and it can also send a signal to the external political environment. We 
expect that one of the main intentions of public managers is using the contract selection as 
a means through which to buffer the supply chain from unexpected political interest. For 
salient products that the polity and policymakers focus on, or those situations where 
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exogenous risks are higher, cost reimbursement contracts might be favored if endogenous 
risks are high, but these contract types may look like “backroom deals” and might garner 
unwanted attention from the external environment. In other words, the seemingly 
appropriate contract for the internal dynamics might not be preferred because of the external 
environment. Therefore, in cases where both endogenous and exogenous risks are high, we 
suggest that risks can be internalized through an incentive contract, in which the supplier 
takes on risk by agreeing to some minimum threshold at a fixed cost, while the government 
takes on risk by agreeing to pay additional costs for any production beyond this threshold. 
Firms “will charge a premium” for taking on risk, and risk sharing between partners becomes 
more efficient as uncertainty increases (Jensen & Stonecash, 2005, p. 777), but they are 
willing to do so because an incentive contract should better buffer the supply chain from 
exogenous shocks from the political system (Lawther & Martin, 2005). For products that are 
subject to high exogenous risk but low endogenous risk, we can see two potential 
strategies. First, if a product is not complex, it is likely that the costs can be estimated well, 
suggesting that a fixed price contract that keeps government costs low may be the best 
approach to buffer the supply chain. On the other hand, if the product in question is mission 
critical, then the government bears some risk in a fixed price contract if the contractor fails to 
deliver. Although there will be legal recourse to recoup costs, this might matter less than the 
timely delivery of some important product, and thus incentive or cost reimbursement 
contracts may be favored. Our expectations are laid out in Table 1. 
 Hypothesis 1: Fixed price contracts will be favored over other contract types 
when both endogenous risk and exogenous risk are low. 
 Hypothesis 2: Cost reimbursement contracts will be favored over other 
contract types when endogenous risk is high and exogenous risk is low. 
 Hypothesis 3: Incentive contracts will be favored over other contract types 
when both endogenous risk and exogenous risk are high. 
 Supply Chain Risk and Contract Design Choice 
 
Data and Method 
Data 
We test our hypotheses of endogenous and exogenous supply chain risk using 
public sector contracts data from federal agencies in the U.S. Contracts data is derived from 
the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG), the only 
comprehensive source of unclassified federal contracts. The Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) requires that contract officers record in FPDS-NG contract actions exceeding $3,000 
in value. As a result, this data set offers an exclusive opportunity to study supply chain risk. 
The unit of analysis in this study is the federal contract. Because the FPDS-NG 
captures all contract actions, including when the contract is initiated and subsequent 
modifications, we execute a process of aggregating the data for each individual contract 
action associated with a specific contract. (For example, Contract A is initiated and is 
subsequently modified three times. One modification might increase the initial value of the 
contract from $30,000 to $50,000. One modification might be a time extension of the 
contract from 12 months to 13. The final modification might deobligate funds associated with 
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the contract by $5,000. As a result, the value of Contract A is ultimately $45,000, and the 
time duration is 13 months.) 
In this preliminary analysis, our data is comprised of 274,440 contracts from 22 
product areas. Federal agencies purchase goods and services using two industry 
categorizations: the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) and the Product 
Services Code (PSC). Table 2 lists the contracts included in this analysis and their 
corresponding NAICS and PSC classification. The sample encompasses all completed 
unclassified contracts for these PSC/NAICS from FY2000–2014.  
Measures 
Dependent variable. Our outcome of interest is a key aspect of how supply chain 
managers deal with risk: the type of formal contract that governs the relationship. The 
dependent variable contract pricing type is a nominal variable and is coded 1 if the contract 
is a fixed price contract (specified in the FPDS-NG as fixed price redetermination, fixed price 
level of effort, firm fixed price, fixed price with economic price adjustment); 2 if the contract is 
an incentive contract (specified in the FPDS-NG as fixed price incentive fee, fixed price 
award fee, cost plus incentive fee, cost plus award fee); 3 if the contract is a cost 
reimbursement contract (specified in the FPDS-NG as cost no fee, cost sharing, cost plus 
fixed fee); and 4 if the contract is a time and materials contract (specified in the FPDS-NG 
as time and materials, labor hours). Table 2 reports the distribution of the dependent 
variable for both products. 
 Dependent Variable: Contract Pricing Type 
 
Put simply, fixed price contracts shift risk primarily to the supplier because the 
supplier receives a fixed amount regardless of any extenuating circumstances. Cost 
reimbursement and time and materials contracts are unique contract types, but are similar in 
that the risk is borne primarily by the government because the government reimburses the 
supplier for relevant costs regardless of the actual amount of a service received. Both of 
these contract types are used when requirements are unable to be properly specified. 
Incentive contracts, which allow suppliers to earn an additional fee based on meeting 
specified performance objectives, are characterized as a risk-sharing position.  
Explanatory variables. We are interested in testing the effects of both endogenous 
and exogenous risks to the supply chain. We examine endogenous risk—related to 
complexity in the supply chain—by analyzing product complexity. We operationalize 
endogenous risk using product complexity measures developed by Kim, Roberts, and 
Brown (forthcoming). The authors surveyed federal acquisition professionals to determine 
their assessment of ease of measurement and specialized investment ratings. They then 
combine these factors into a product complexity rating as reported in Table 3. We use their 
findings to study contracts from 22 product areas, allowing us to assess both endogenous 
and exogenous risk in our analysis. 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 160 - 
 Product Categories and Complexity Scores 
 
Exogenous risks—those factors that affect the supply chain but are external to the 
organizations involved in the exchange, and that the actors have little ability to control—are 
operationalized using three variables all intended to capture aspects of the potential interest 
and saliency of the supply chain with political representatives: contract value, market 
competition, and competitive limitations. Taken together, we expect that heightened 
exogenous risks will decrease the use of fixed price contracts and drive public purchasers to 
other contract pricing types in order to share or redistribute risk.  
 Contract value is the logged value of total dollars obligated to the contract. 
This is measured in real dollars with 2014 as the base year. Contract value is 
a clear proxy for political interest, particularly during times of tight budgets 
(Eckerd & Snider, 2016). While the size of the procurement budget is not 
necessarily indicative of politically contentious programs, with all else equal, it 
seems reasonable to assume that larger acquisition projects will draw more 
political attention. That is, we expect greater political interest and attention to 
the contract as contract value increases, which may result in selecting 
different contract pricing types. Specifically, we see two different responses to 
high value contracts depending on the nature of the endogenous supply 
chain risk. When endogenous risk is low, we expect that high value contracts 
will tend to be fixed price. When endogenous risk is higher, we expect more 
risk sharing in the form of incentive contracts.  
 Market competition is the logged value of the total number of offers received 
for the contract. This variable is a proxy for the level of market competition for 
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the particular product. While this is not a direct measure of political salience, 
when markets are highly competitive, exogenous attention may be more likely 
to identify perceived waste or exorbitant costs. An older example of this logic 
is the infamous Packard Commission’s 1986 report identifying the 
Department of Defense’s $435 hammer and $600 toilet seat (Blue Ribbon 
Commission on Defense Management, 1986). More recently, consider the 
scrutiny received over the ultimate cost of a fuel station in Iraq (Davenport, 
2015). Thus in circumstances where there is much market competition but 
endogenous risk is low, a situation of high exogenous risk, we expect to see 
greater use of fixed price contracts that place more risk on the supplier. This 
is, in part, due to the lower costs of switching suppliers if contract 
performance is unsatisfactory. However, as with contract value, we expect a 
different response if there is high endogenous risk. We expect that when 
market competition is low, but endogenous risk high, cost reimbursement 
contracts may be preferred to ensure program continuity (thus buffering 
exogenous interest), but when both competition and endogenous risk are 
high, we expect incentive contracts to be favored as a mechanism to share 
risk across the supply chain. 
 Competitive limitations is coded 1 if the contract is a set aside (e.g., small 
business, economically disadvantaged business owned by women or 
veterans, disabled veteran owned, and HUB zone) or 0 if the contract was not 
designated as a set aside contract. Set aside contracts are contract design 
tools aimed at leveling the competitive environment for otherwise 
disadvantaged firms. These political tools can introduce exogenous risk into 
the supply chain by restricting the supplier market and also potentially 
drawing interest from political actors who designed the set aside not to meet 
supply chain efficiency goals, but rather to meet broader social/public policy 
goals of inclusion and equity (Eckerd & Eckerd, 2016). When endogenous 
risk is low, we expect that contracts with competitive limitations will be fixed 
price. When endogenous risk is higher, we expect that incentive contracts will 
be favored when there are competitive limitations in order to share risk.  
Control variables. We control for several factors that can influence the relationship 
between supply chain risk (whether endogenous or exogenous) and contract pricing type. 
We control for contract length, which is measured as the total length of the contract in years. 
We include a control for unrestricted competition to measure whether the contract was bid 
with unrestricted competition (e.g., full and open) or restricted competition (e.g., sole 
source), coded 1 if unrestricted and 0 if restricted. This can affect the number of bidders on 
a contract. The Department of Defense (DoD) accounts for approximately two-thirds of 
federal contracts. Because the DoD has more experience with contracting in general, we 
expect that they are more likely to use more diverse contract pricing types. The DoD is 
coded 1 if the contract agency is the DoD, and 0 otherwise. We also include year dummy 
variables to correspond to the fiscal year the earliest contract action associated with each 
contract. This is typically the year the first agreement was signed, which is also when the 
contract pricing type is established. This allows us to control for unobserved policy and/or 
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Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for each of the independent variables. 
 Independent Variables: Descriptive Statistics  
 
Method 
Given the non-ordinal categorical nature of our dependent variable, contract type, we 
use a multinomial logistical regression model to test our hypotheses. We estimate 
preferences for incentive contracts compared to fixed price contracts, cost reimbursement 
contracts compared to fixed price contracts, and time and materials contracts compared to 
fixed price contracts. Relative-risk ratios are reported for ease of interpretation. Relative-risk 
ratios and standard errors are generated using a clustering technique to obtain robust 
standard errors. Standard errors are clustered at the broader independent delivery vehicle 
(IDV) level (or the unique contract level if the contract is not part of an IDV). Numerous 
delivery or task orders, each a unique contract, often fall under one broader IDV. Examples 
of IDVs include blanket purchase agreements, federal supply schedules, and task and 
delivery order contracts that are government-wide or multi-agency agency contracts. 
Although these contracts are unique purchases, they are acquired using the same 
guidelines and pricing associated with the IDV. Because these contracts are similarly 
structured, we need to account for the similarities amongst these unique but associated 
contracts. As a result, standard errors are clustered at the IDV level. Approximately 10% of 
contracts were missing set aside data. As a result, the model is restricted to 246,362 
contracts. 
Findings 
The results of multinomial regression are reported in Table 5. We expect a high level 
of exogenous risk to be indicated by a combination of a high contract dollar value, low levels 
of market competition when endogenous risk is high and high levels of market competition 
when endogenous risk is low, and the presence of competitive limitations. High levels of 
product complexity are evidence of endogenous risk. When these risk factors are low, we 
expect fixed price contracts to be favored. We therefore compare each of the other contract 
types to fixed price contracts which are the most prevalent type of contract selected, by far, 
with nearly 80% of the contracts in our data being fixed price.  
Incentive contracts compared to fixed price contracts. As expected, when 
endogenous risk is high, incentive contracts are favored over fixed price contracts. Only one 
exogenous factor, contract value, is statistically significant, suggesting that as contract value 
increases, so too does the preference for incentive contracts over fixed price contracts. Both 
findings are consistent with hypothesis 3. We find competitive limitations (set asides) are 
less likely with incentive contracts compared to fixed price contracts. We find a statistically 
positive relationship between contract length and incentive contracts compared to fixed price 
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contracts. We also find that compared to civilian agencies, the DoD is more likely to use 
incentive contracts than fixed price contracts when endogenous risk is low. 
Cost reimbursement contracts compared to fixed price contracts. Again, as 
expected, when endogenous risk measured by product complexity is high, contracts are 
more likely to be cost reimbursement than fixed price contracts. All three exogenous factors, 
competitive limitations, market competition, and contract value, reach levels of statistical 
significance. Cost reimbursement contracts are favored in situations with fewer competitive 
limitations, less market competition, and higher contract value than fixed price contracts, 
which provide mixed evidence for hypothesis 2. The value of the contract and market 
competition is consistent with our expectations, but competitive limitations is not. We find 
that cost reimbursement contracts are likely to be longer than fixed price contracts, less 
likely to be competed with restrictions, and more likely to be DoD contracts compared to 
fixed price contracts. 
Time and materials contracts compared to fixed price contracts. When endogenous 
risk, product complexity, is high, time and materials contracts are preferred over fixed price 
contracts. We also see that all three exogenous factors, competitive limitations, market 
competition, and contract value reach levels of statistical significance. Time and materials 
contracts are favored in situations with fewer competitive limitations, greater market 
competition, and greater contract value than fixed price contracts, which again provides 
mixed evidence for hypothesis 1. We find a statistically positive relationship between 
contract length and time and materials contracts compared to fixed price contracts. Time 
and materials contracts are more likely to be competed with restrictions compared to fixed 
price contracts. We also find that compared to civilian agencies, the DoD is less likely to use 
time and materials contracts than fixed price contracts. 
 Multinomial Logit Analysis 
 
N = 246,354 
Chi2 = 5050.254*** 
Pseudo R2 = 0.35 
*p<.10   **p<.05    ***p<.01; two-tailed tests 
a112,249 clusters at the IDVPIID level  
Year dummies not shown 
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In order to fully test hypothesis 3, we also compare incentive contracts to cost 
reimbursement and time and materials contracts. To do this, we compute relative-risk ratios 
with varying base categories for the two explanatory variables that reach statistical 
significance across all contract types: contract value and product characteristics. Results are 
reported in Table 6. We find evidence that incentive contracts are favored over other 
contract types when contract value and product characteristics are high, substantiating H3. 
 Relative-Risk Ratios 
 
Discussion 
In this research, we argued that the characteristics of supply chain risk would, in part, 
predict the preferences regarding the nature of the formal contract that governed buyer–
supplier relationships in the public sector. We find some support for these hypotheses, but 
some results are also mixed. First, we expected that, in general, fixed price contracts would 
be favored when endogenous risk was low, as compared to situations when endogenous 
risk was high. We expected that fixed price contracts would be especially favored when 
exogenous risk was also low, and we see some support for this; however, the results are 
mixed. This may indicate that there are different considerations about managing supply 
chain risk depending on the nature of the exogenous risk. If exogenous risk is thought of as 
the potential for political attention (as operationalized by the dollar value of the contract), 
then our results fit with our expectations in hypothesis 1. If exogenous risk is conceived in 
other terms, mangers may be following more idiosyncratic approaches to risk management. 
When endogenous and exogenous risk is high (as measured by market competition and 
contract value) cost reimbursement contracts are favored over fixed price contracts, 
generally supporting hypothesis 2. 
We find partial support for hypothesis 3. We purported that when both exogenous 
and endogenous risk is high, incentive contracts would be favored over other contract types. 
The results show that for the most costly of government contracts, risk sharing between 
supplier and government purchaser is preferable and incentive contracts are favored.  
In no case did we find competitive limitation, or use of a set aside, affecting contract 
choices as we expected. For both cost reimbursement and time and materials contracts, the 
measure was statistically significant and negative, noting that managers are less inclined to 
restrict competition through set asides for contracts, wherein the buyer assumes greater risk 
than the supplier. This might mean that buyers are willing to amplify risk when that risk is 
shifted to the supplier in fixed price contracts, but are less likely to increase risk through set 
aside provisions when the risk is borne or partially borne by the government. 
We also see evidence that these considerations might be affected by the nature of 
the relationship between the contracting partners. In all cases, when contract lengths are 
longer, all contract types are favored over fixed price contracts, suggesting that the longer 
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the contract, the more willing the government is to shoulder risk. Although length of time is 
an insufficient proxy, this may indicate that like other types of supply chains, as contracting 
partners work together longer, the relational contract is able to strengthen, mitigating the 
need to specify risk in the formal contract (Eckerd & Eckerd, 2016).  
Limitations 
We acknowledge some limitations of this preliminary study. We have only examined 
22 product categories and their respective complexity ratings in this analysis, which does 
not cover the vast array of products and services purchased by the federal government. We 
also acknowledge that our measures of exogenous risk are incomplete. While each of our 
measures represent aspects of exogenous risk as they relate to the political process, we 
recognize the need to develop a more complete picture of exogenous risk that takes into 
account characteristics that more specifically gauge political salience in addition to 
susceptibility to natural and or manmade disruptions.  
Nevertheless, we believe that this preliminary analysis offers a proof of concept 
suggesting that there are meaningful relationships between the levels of endogenous and 
exogenous risk and the choices that are made regarding the formal governance 
arrangements in public sector supply chains. In short, we argue that the selection of contract 
type presents public sector contract managers with an opportunity to manage risks. 
Conclusion 
In this manuscript, we argued that supply chain management choices are affected by 
both the extent to which there is a risk of disruption within the supply chain and external to 
the supply chain as well. We argued that public sector supply chains are subject to 
considerable exogenous risk and that studying supply chain management decisions in the 
public sector offers a unique opportunity to understand how supply chain managers deal 
with both endogenous and exogenous risk situations. In this preliminary study, we found 
evidence suggesting that, as expected, when endogenous risk is low, suppliers tend to bear 
most of the disruption risk by agreeing to fixed price contracts. Conversely, when 
endogenous risk is high, we find partial support that government purchasers are willing to 
bear most of the risk by agreeing to cost reimbursement or time and materials contracts. We 
also find partial support of our proposition that when both endogenous and exogenous risk 
is high, governments are more likely share the risk with suppliers by favoring incentive 
contracts. 
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